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Pinza's theory that pozzo and fossa graves existed side by side at the same time, Miss Adams follows Modestov in explaining the change in burial rite by the coming of the Etruscans. Against this view I would particularly urge that the change of rite is most complete not on the coast but in the inland settlements of the Faliscan and Latin districts which the foreign immigrant could hardly have reached first. The discussion of the activities of the Greek and Phoenician traders at this period is especially valuable.

Of great interest are the next chapters on the Etruscans in Latium. Miss Adams believes that they first seized Praeneste as a stronghold that commanded the overland route to Campania and that the powerful rulers of that city, while maintaining communication by way of Gabii, Fidenae, and Veii with Caere and other sections of Etruria, developed their own port at Satricum. In the sixth century, she thinks, the Etruscans seized Rome which had hitherto been perhaps in a different "trade circle" and developed there an important commercial center. Well aware of the dangers of inferences from the absence of archaeological evidence, Miss Adams has made very guarded statements. Yet we may ask how Etruscan influence can have been strong enough in the eighth century in Latium to lead to a complete abandonment of cremation for inhumation, and yet have limited itself in the seventh century to Praeneste and the lines of communication with Etruria, Campania, and the sea. When in 509 the Etruscan dynasty was expelled from Rome, that city was, Miss Adams thinks, in a commanding position which she was later unable to maintain. The first treaty with Carthage for which Miss Adams accepts Polybius' dating in the first year of the republic, shows that though the Latins had little real interest in foreign commerce there was at the time a possibility—long to remain unrealized—of Rome's becoming a commercial center.

The bibliography and references are full even if the omission in many cases of page references makes the material less readily useful. The lists of important discoveries are of great service, though it is hard to see why in a study that appeared in April, 1921, the terra cottas from Veii should be said to be "still awaiting publication." Every student of early Latin history will be grateful to Miss Adams for having given meaning and significance to baffling masses of material that fill the museums of Rome.

L. R. TAYLOR

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La Légende Socratique et les Sources de Platon. Par EUGÈNE DUPRÉEL.
Fondation Universitaire de Belgique. Bruxelles: Robert Sand,
1922.

Professor Burnet's paradox that everything in Plato is Socratic was bound to conjure up to its philological anteros. Professor Dupréel's thesis is, that Socrates is a literary invention of the Socratics, and that most of

Plato's ideas and much of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* derive from the great Sophists of the fifth century, Gorgias, Protagoras, and especially Prodicus and Hippias, the supreme original thinkers of the age of Pericles: "A ce plus haut sommet de la pensée antique, ce n'est pas le nom de Socrate, ni celui de Platon, ni celui d'Aristote qui méritent de demeurer attachés, c'est, outre les noms perdus des penseurs qu'il faut continuer à appeler les Idéalistes ou les Pythagoriciens, celui de leur émule et contradicteur Hippias."

I should be sorry for more than one reason to take a purely negative attitude toward this readable and ingenious book. I am tired of the criticism of errors, though I still think it the chief need of present-day scholarship. I have read the book with interest, and I sympathize with the writer's protest against the method of combining isolated texts, and with his own better practice of analyzing the context of the passages which he cites. Nevertheless, he has not proved his thesis, and he himself admits that the three parts of the book swarm with hypotheses: "parmi lesquelles il en est d'assez aventurées." The only justification of this would be the argument that I usually reject, the consideration, namely, that only by exploiting an hypothesis to the limit can we determine its final value for "science." The negative half of Professor Dupréel's theory presents no difficulties. I can readily admit, for I have often said, that we know nothing of the historical Socrates, and that the Platonic Socrates is an ideal literary creation—too good to be true.¹

I admit also the general probability that Plato had read widely in fifth-century literature, as well as in the writings of his contemporaries, and drew many suggestions from both. Pater said as much in his *Plato and Platonism*, and Wilamowitz' magisterial pronouncements that Plato never read, say Thucydides, or Herodotus, are easily disproved. But the attempted specific attribution of many of Plato's and Aristotle's leading ideas to a Hippias or a Prodicus is presumptively foredoomed to failure, and neither Professor Dupréel's methods nor the particular arguments on which he relies go far to overcome this unfavorable presumption. The method is an extension of that practiced by Dümmler, Joel, Dittmar, and others whom he quotes, "Parallels" between Plato and contemporary or later spurious literature are treated as evidence, not of the imitation of Plato, but of the use of a common source. This is undoubtedly a possibility. But the systematic assumption that it is always, or usually, the fact vitiates most of the source hunting and "literary feuds" literature of the past fifty years. Professor Dupréel admits that the *Eryxias* is a pastiche of Plato in form, but traces resemblance in substance to a common source, Prodicus. He is aware that the *περὶ ἀρετῆς* reads like a trivial résumé of the *Meno*, but will have it that it is a youthful work of Plato. He finds in the argument

¹ Cf. *Classical Philology*, *supra*, p. 74; and article "Socrates" in the *New International Encyclopaedia*.

of the *Dialexeis* that he who knows justice will know injustice a parallel to the infinitely subtler and finer statement of the dependence of rhetoric on dialectic in the *Phaedrus*, which again, he thinks, points to a common source. And in similar comparisons throughout the book he neglects the principle of sound criticism, that the mere crude hint and suggestion of an idea counts for very little. Doubtless some approximation to almost any notion can be found in Euripides, and if we had their texts, could be found in the Greek Sophists. What sets Plato apart and makes him unique is a mastery of ideas, a subtlety of coherent and nicely qualified reasoning, which cannot be found in any of his predecessors, and which his modern critics will never understand until they analyze the contexts and secondary intentions of their quotations much more critically than even Professor Dupréel has tried to do.

What, then, are his proofs that Hippias towers above Plato and Aristotle on the summit of fifth-century thought? Assuming the greater Hippias to be genuine, he treats all that Socrates there says of the definition as a defense of the theory of ideas. I am not concerned to refute that exaggeration of a theory of my own. For in the unity of Plato's thought the terminology of the definition may always imply the theory of ideas. Serious fallacy begins with Professor Dupréel's confusion of Hippias' incapacity to comprehend the nature of a definition with a reasoned rejection of the theory of ideas from the standpoint of a conscious Nominalism. There is plainly nothing of the kind in the dialogue. Hippias' inability to distinguish a definition of beauty from a pretty girl is precisely that of Meno and many other interlocutors, whom Socrates initiates into the elements of logic. If there were any independent evidence that Hippias had ever thought seriously, or was capable of serious thought about the nature of universals, it would be competent to argue that Plato's caricature misrepresented as incapacity for logic what was really a rational rejection of the theory of ideas by a philosophic Nominalist. As it is, the assumption has nothing to support it except a misunderstanding of one of the funniest passages of the dialogue, that in which Hippias, like a modern professor of education, bitterly complains of the atrophizing accuracy and the cheese-paring scholastic abstract logic by which Socrates breaks up and renders static the continuous flux of the concrete, dynamic entities of life and integral experience. Professor Dupréel sees in this delicious parody a conscientious citation of Hippias' philosophic repudiation of the theory of ideas in favor of an Aristotelian doctrine of the indissoluble unity of matter and form in substance. And in the succession of blundering and tentative definitions of the *kalon*, he discovers the outlines of an entire treatise on the beautiful which he attributes to Hippias. By means of the word *πενυκότα*, which is all they have in common, he identifies the thought of this passage of the *Hippias Maior* (301.B) with a totally disparate idea in *Cratylus* (386.D-E), in order to confirm his theory that the "pre-Aristotelianism" of the *Cratylus* is due to Hippias. The *Cratylus*,

without doubt, anticipates and is perhaps one source of the Aristotelian doctrine of matter and form, as others have perceived. But there is not one iota of evidence that it in turn is derived from Hippias.

All over-ingenuous books are protected against critical reviewing by the fact that a really critical review would occupy as much space as the book itself. The general method of the rehabilitation of Prodicus is to attribute to him everything in the argument of the dialogues that mention him that can be associated with any of the passages in which Socrates playfully alludes to his discrimination of synonyms. Thus Laches' indignation at the sophistic distinction between "brave" and "fearless" is used to refer to Prodicus as source the whole theory of bravery set forth by Nicias. Many scholars and pragmatist philosophers have anticipated M. Dupréel in the employment of similar methods for restoration of the true Protagorean philosophy.

Once more I am sorry to seem to take a purely negative position toward what is after all a well-written, laborious, stimulating, thought-provoking piece of work, which every Platonic library should possess. But how is Platonic scholarship to progress if diametrically opposed interpretations are all favorably reviewed and allowed to stand side by side with no attempt to settle the issues that they raise? Wilamowitz, Dupréel, Burnet ignore one another. A negative attitude toward all of them will have at least a 50 per cent chance of being right. And a scholar who translates *μετὰ λόγον* "après le raisonnement" (p. 347) surely invites scrutiny of his arguments.

PAUL SHOREY

Philostratus and Eunapius, The Lives of the Sophists. With an English translation by WILMER CAVE WRIGHT. Loeb Classical Library. London: William Heinemann; New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1922.

Mrs. Wright's studies of Julian and her familiarity with the later Greek rhetoric designated her as the Loeb translator of Philostratus and Eunapius. She writes a fluent and idiomatic English which follows closely the thought of the Greek, yet does not read like a translation. Well-written introductions supply all the information that the modern reader will need for the intelligence of these biographies and a helpful glossary of Greek rhetorical terms and an index complete what will prove one of the most useful and instructive volumes of the series. There are very few oversights. In *Lives of the Sophists* 585 I think Rohde is right in taking *ἐπεσιάζοντο* figuratively. Herodes, perhaps, does not "expound with copious comments a hundred verses," but speaks for a time measured by a hundred verses.

In 5.87 *σκήρτημα* is not, I think, "a boisterous Greek dance" but is used metaphorically as in Stob. Flor. 68.37: *ἐξοίχεται τὸ νεοτήσιον σκήρτημα*